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 1. Introduction: labour market information (LMI) systems as a monitoring tool and the 
Italian data-framework 
 A recent report of the Upjohn Institute on a framework for an optimal labour market information 
(hereafter LMI) system said that “government must play a major role to ensure there is a public 
LMI system, which produce reliable and relevant information, and that LMI is disseminated in user 
friendly ways to increase the likelihood of improving the efficiency of markets. In addition to 
assembling relevant data, public agencies have a key role in transforming facts about economic 
activity into useful labour market” (Woods and O’Leary, 2006). 
The study offers some important criteria for the optimization of an LMI system, and also uses 
standard and innovative data mining techniques as final instruments in public and private 
monitoring process of labour market. 
Our work is based upon micro-data generated by the administrative and operative database systems 
of certain specific, more advanced Italian sub-areas. 
The paper offers selected results from the first version of an analytical process of data-mining 
applied to the labour market within the province of Bologna, in Italy. 
A data set included in an LMI system can be organized in several ways; however,  starting from a 
general database, an optimal data-mining process will be characterized by demand data (labour, 
skill sets, etc), occupational characteristics, information about the education and permanent training 
of each worker, information about the crosswalks of the workers with no stable employment trough 
different status at different times in the worker’s life-cycle.   
In particular, causal inference methods shall be applied to semi-automatic Data Mining approaches, 
in order to create a system for evaluating the performance of the Provincial Job Centres, whereby 
the success of policies designed to guarantee equal employment opportunities can be duly 
monitored. Our variable target is represented by the number of people hired on full-time contracts.  
The results obtained give a closer insight into the working of the Italian labour market after the 
introduction of Law 30/2004 (the “Biagi Law”), which provided for substantial reductions in 
employment protection. 
 
2. The dual nature of the labour market 
The employment crisis that dogged the European Community throughout the 1990s has led to a 
growth in forms of employment which cannot be compared with full time, life-time work; these 
include part-time employment, temporary employment, jobs created by the public authorities; and 
work experience schemes for young people, as well as jobs based on unusual schemes (OECD 
2007). 
Italian labour market reforms implemented from 1995 onwards, have led to a substantial increase in 
the number of temporary workers and, more generally, of jobs with non-standard working 
schedules. At the same time, Italy has witnessed a substantial fall in unemployment rates, and a rise 
in employment rates, although labour productivity has grown at a very slow pace compared with 
other European countries. 
There is also strong evidence, according to the OECD, that a partial reform which weakens 
regulations on temporary employment, but fails to modify the nature of permanent employment 
contracts, may well produce negative effects in the long term. In fact, when the regulation of full-
time employment remains stringent, firms tend to hire temporary workers, and are very reluctant to 
transform their temporary contracts into permanent contracts. Temporary labour is often used by 
firms as a mechanism with which to render employment more flexible in relation to the fluctuations 
in the economic cycle (Blanchard and Landier, 2001). This gives rise to an increased concentration 
of turn-over among specific groups within the labour force that are over-represented in the 
temporary employment sector. This, in turn, implies both high levels of employment and income 
insecurity for the said workers, and underinvestment in human capital, which leads to a worsening 
of the latter’s productivity potential, and of levels of occupational safety (Guell and Petrangolo, 
2000; Booth et al. 2002, Guadalupe, 2003). The dualistic nature of the Italian labour market, and the 
process of “segregation” of “atypical” workers, is further confirmed if we examine those matrices 
drawn up by the CNEL (2007) regarding changes in the professional status of workers. If we take 
100 to be the number of temporary workers in 2005, what we see is that after one year, only 29% of 
the said workers has managed to secure a permanent employment contract, while 65% continue to 
be employed in temporary jobs, and the remaining 5% results as being unemployed. In order to 
interpret these figures correctly, we need to bear in mind that approximately 88% of those workers 
with a temporary employment contract declare that “the temporary nature of their job is not of their 
own choosing”, compared with a figure of 55% for the EU countries as a whole (Biggeri 2006). 
With regard to those workers employed on “semi-subordinate”, employer-coordinated freelance 
contracts, there is not that much likelihood of their being offered permanent employment contracts 
(only about 12% do, in fact, move on to permanent contracts), and this may be due in part to the 
fact that a certain percentage of them do not aspire to, or look for, dependent employment
1
. The 
timescales of transition from temporary employment or employment on a “semi-subordinate” basis, 
to permanent employment, thus constitute one of the most important points in the present labour 
market situation both in Italy and the rest of Europe.  
The present study consists of two specific lines of investigation, which are part of a wider 
monitoring system that, in a multi-year work in progress, covers the province of Bologna and the 
centralised administrative data from the Job Centres. The first line taken involves the measurement 
of the probability of transition from the status of temporary worker to that of permanent worker, 
with a special focus being placed on young workers; the second line, on the other hand, regards the 
effects of those active employment policies
2
 that the Italian government has begin to implement in 
an attempt to improve the employability of the country’s workforce, with a special focus on the 
more disadvantaged segments of the population (young people, immigrants, women and early 
school leavers). It is generally acknowledged that it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of 
active job programs because of the selectivity bias that affects inflows into such programs. A direct 
comparison of unemployed people who attend these programs with those that do not, may lead to 
spurious conclusions about the effectiveness of the programs themselves. Econometric methods 
have been proposed to overcome this problem (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983 and 1984; Bondonio 
and Greenbaum, 2007), and there are also a number of case studies that adopt an experimental 
approach (see e.g. Graversen and van Ours, 2008; Black et al. 2003). The present study proposes a 
different approach, one that is based on Data Mining methods; this enables us to use observational 
data collected by administrative sources (Centri Per l’Impiego, Job Centres), that may provide 
useful information about the specific program best suited to each job seeker.     
The province of Bologna is one of the most highly-developed regions in Italy. It has about 950.000 
inhabitants, and its pro-capita GDP in 2007 ranked third out of all Italian provinces; the presence of 
manufacturing is also strong (34.8% of all workers are employed in manufacturing industry). As far 
as the labour market is concerned, the labour force participation rate is one of the highest in Italy, 
while employment rates (for both men and women) are also very high (even higher than the Lisbon 
parameters – see Table 1). 
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 The Ministry of Labour, in its document entitled Occupazione e forme di lavoro precario (Employment and precarious 
forms of working) (Rome, 13
th
 November 2007), has also divulged estimates regarding the process of transition from 
one form of employment to another, using both ISTAT figures gathered during the Labour Force survey, and INPS data 
built on the basis of the Longitudinal Employed Persons and Pensioners Database. The results taken from the two 
sources contrast somewhat, in that in the case of the ISTAT figures for 2005-2006, with 100 taken as the number of 
temporary workers in 2005, 71% were still temporarily employed at the end of 2006; according to the INPS figures, on 
the other hand, the probability of remaining in temporary employment after one year resulted as being 40%.    
2
 The OECD (1993) subdivides active policies into five different categories: the temporary creation of work, 
professional training, actual services for job seekers, employment allowances for those in regular work, and the funding 
of new business enterprises.  
Table 1 – The Lisbon parameters and the province of Bologna 
Group Rate of 
employment 
Rate of 
female 
employment  
Rate of 
employment 
among those 
aged 55-64 * 
2010 Targets 70.0 60.0 50.0 
Bologna 71.1 63.4 31.5 
 
According to official statistics, the unemployment rate in 2007 was very low. However, the number 
of  people registered with Job Centres (Centri Per l'Impiego) is more than double the official 
unemployment figure.   
Before expounding the results of the analyses conducted using the Kaplan-Meier filter, we would 
like to examine the composition, in terms of age and contract type, of job placements in the 
province of Bologna during the first half of 2007, in order to highlight any links between the stage 
in the life cycles of those persons involved in the said job placements, and the type of employment 
contract they were offered.  
The job-placement-by-age analysis, based upon figures for the first half of 2007 (Table 2 below), 
may be summed up as follows: the average worker comes into the labour market at a very young 
age, usually either as an apprentice or on a temporary contract, although fairly often as a 
coordinated and continuous collaborator, then works in a series of temporary jobs, before being 
offered a permanent employment contract (at the age of 35 or over). This is, of course, a picture of 
the “average worker”, and does not reflect the heterogeneous nature of the work experiences of 
different individuals (this question shall be dealt with in more detail in the following section). 
An examination of the figures  we have for job placements clearly reveals the dual nature of the 
labour market in the province of Bologna: while the majority of workers are employed on 
permanent contracts, there are nevertheless a substantial number of “flexible/precarious” workers. 
The interesting thing is that job placements, and the termination of employment contracts, tend to 
involve the latter of these two categories (almost to the exclusion of the former): this category is 
characterised by the “intermittent” nature of the work in question, by the constant rotation of those 
being hired, by the limited duration of the employment relationship, and finally, by the limited 
likelihood of temporary employment contracts being transformed into permanent ones. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Job placements according to contract type and age group during the first half of 2007 
   Age group    Total 
 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 and 
above 
 
Temporary employed 
work  
34.6 32.9 41.5 43.4 26.5 59.1 21,449 
Permanent employed 
work  
11.0 28.2 36.5 37.0 43.1 12.2 14,854 
Apprenticeship  29.1 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3,829 
Agency-based work 11.4 11.8 10.2 5.1 5.6 0.1 5,560 
Member of a 
cooperative  
2.3 3.1 3.7 1.5 1.5 0.1 1,564 
Coordinated and 
continuous 
collaboration 
0.8 1.6 1.3 4.2 4.2 10.6 823 
Temporary work on 
specific projects  
3.4 5.7 4.4 15.0 15.0 14.8 2,823 
Others 7.4 4.8 2.4 4.1 4.6 3.3 2,397 
Total 9,973 20,504 13,170 6618 2,395 639 53,299 
 
Does the type of contract affect the duration of employment in a given job, that is, the time between 
“placement” and “termination”? The answer is, of course, yes, given that permanent job placements 
usually come to an end for objective, financial reasons, whereas flexible/precarious job placements, 
by their very nature, are of a temporary nature. Nevertheless, it is important to try to measure just 
how long any employment contract lasts, and to distinguish the two types of contract. The shorter a 
temporary contract, the greater the uncertainty the worker in question will have about his/her future, 
and this will have repercussions on the accumulation of human capital, on labour productivity, and 
on occupational health and safety.  
 
3. How long does temporary work last ? 
Measuring the “duration” of job placements is not a simple task, however, since the likelihood of 
placement and termination depends on the passing of time, and varies according to the temporal 
distance from the start of the phenomenon in question. In such cases, the variable in question is 
constituted by the duration of the state in question (in this case, the state of being employed), which 
within a given observation period may arise more than once. Thus we need to analyse data 
expressing the time between an originating event (in our case, a job placement) and a terminal event 
(the end of employment) marking an individual’s exit from a given state (that of being employed). 
Such data may be interpreted and elaborated according to a specific statistical approach known as 
duration data analysis, or survival analysis (Cox and Oates, 1984), which has also been utilised by 
Booth (2001 and 2002), Alboni at al.(2008) and Evangelista and Rinaldi (2008). 
One of the fundamental features of such analyses is the evaluation of the contribution made 
estimation of the survival of those persons who never experience the terminal event (termination of 
employment) during the observation period: these are the so-called censured observations.  
Usually we think that the average (or median) duration of the observed job placements constitutes 
an indicator of the likelihood of an employment contract being terminated: this would only be 
correct, however, if all the individuals in question had been given the same time from the start of 
their job placement, which is clearly not the case. In fact, scholars generally accept that in such 
cases, an estimate is required of a survival function representing the probability, over time, that an 
individual is still going to be in his/her job, at least up until the end of the observation period. Thus 
we took the SILER database for the period 2004-2006, and used it to estimate the survival functions 
for job placements, subdivided according to the type of employment contract in question. In order 
to elaborate the survival curves, we adopted the following classification:  
 permanent employed labour contracts (including those of cooperative members);   
 temporary employed labour contracts; 
 apprenticeship contracts; 
 agency-work contracts and other contracts (mainly contracts for continuous and coordinated 
collaboration). 
The resulting survival curves are shown in Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1 – Survival curves, according to contract type, for the province of Bologna (2004-
2006) 
 
 
Source: Elaboration of SILER data – Province of Bologna 
 
The above graph is crystal clear: given a certain type of job placement, you can trace the probability 
of an individual still being employed under that contract after a certain number of days. Of course, 
by separating the various types of employment contract, the resulting probabilities diverge 
considerably. As far as regards permanent employment contracts (fig.2), with reference to job 
placements during the period 2004-2006 once again, the probability that a job placement lasts more 
than 1,000 days is slightly more than 80% (which in practice corresponds to the length of the period 
subject to analysis). The duration of apprentices’ job placements is also rather lengthy, the 
probability of such contracts lasting more than 836 days being greater than 50%. As far as regards 
temporary employment contracts, the median duration of such contracts is much lower, ranging 
from 29 days in the case of temporary contracts through job placement agencies, to 105 days in the 
case of temporary job placements, and to 213 days in the case of job placements on “other 
contracts” (mainly contracts for continuous and coordinated collaboration, as we have already 
seen). The summarised picture shown in Table 3 below also highlights the considerable precision of 
the estimates, given the low standard error for the estimate of median duration. 
This situation could be seen, in a certain sense, as “innate” to the type of contract in question: 
nevertheless, there are also certain aspects of precarity and insecurity associated with the extremely 
short “expected duration” of the contracts, in terms of both the insecurity of the job and of the 
previously-mentioned strictly economic repercussions.   
Table 3 below reveals the extremely high number of job placements registered during the three-year 
period (around 382,000), compared with the average number of employed persons which varies 
between 420,000 and 450,000 during that same period. There is thus a substantial process of job 
creation and destruction, in that the considerable number of movements (an average of around 
130,000 a year) contrasts with the increase of only 20,000 or so in the number of persons in work 
during the period 2004-2006: hence the figures for the province of Bologna would seem to indicate 
that the majority of firms create new jobs in the form of both temporary and permanent posts. When 
the said temporary contracts come to an end, the majority are renewed for a further temporary 
period, whereas only a very limited number get transformed into permanent contracts (Cahuc and 
Postel-Vinay, 2002). 
 
Table 3 – Summarised survival curve figures  
Type of contract No. placements Average duration S.E. average 
duration 
Median duration 
Temp. Contracts 
through agencies 
31,031 59 0,656 29 
Temp. contracts 161,023 161 0,498 105 
Other contracts 6,694 412 6,123 213 
Apprentices 29,633 658 3,003 836 
Permanent 
contracts 
154,247 836 1,127 N.A. 
Source: Elaboration of SILER data – Province of Bologna  
 
It is interesting to see whether the duration of the temporary job placements depends in some way 
on demographic factors. To this end, and without going beyond job placements on temporary 
contracts (that is, excluding apprenticeship contracts and permanent contracts), we have estimated 
the survival curves according to gender (Fig. 2) and to age group (Fig. 3). The age-group 
classification fails to reveal any difference worthy of note: the median duration of job placements is 
98 days for women and 120 days for men, which comes down to 98 days for the age groups 25-34 
and 35-44, whereas the median duration for the over-45s age group is 92 days. It would thus seem 
that for younger people, the “precarity” of temporary job placements is no less pronounced than it is 
for older people (and in particular, for those over 45), for whom one may presume the existence of a 
negative signal effect related to the fact that they are looking for work at a mature age, a signal that 
contributes towards “confining them” to short-term (temporary) jobs. The situation is very different 
for young people (under 25 years), whose survival curve is significantly removed from, and 
constantly higher than, the others. It is very likely that this pattern is due to the fact that people 
under 25 usually get jobs as apprentices, under an employment contract that although of a 
temporary kind, is usually of considerable duration, as Figure 1 shows and Tassinari et al. (2007) 
confirm. 
As far as concerns gender, it would seem that there is little or no difference between women and 
men. 
 
Figure 2 – Survival curves for job placements on temporary contracts, according to gender 
(2004-2006) 
 
Source: Elaboration of SILER data – Province of Bologna  
 
 
 
 Figure 3 -  Survival curves for job placements on temporary contracts, according to age 
(2004-2006)  
 
Source: Elaboration of SILER data – Province of Bologna  
 
 
4. The effectiveness of  the CPI’s  Workfare Action 
One of the principal aims of the work of the CPIs (Job Centres) is, as has already been mentioned, 
that of reinforcing the level of equality in a strongly differentiated workforce, by trying to 
compensate for the disadvantaged status of the “weaker” segments of the workforce in terms of job 
opportunities and the quality of the work that they are eventually offered. Those registered with the 
Job Centres within the Province of Bologna constitute a population (see Table 4) dominated by 
groups with structural characteristics that tend to hinder their employability (such as women, older 
people, immigrants, and those with few or no educational qualifications). 
 
 
 
Table 4 Changes in unemployment (according to the definitions established by Legislative 
Decree 297/02) within the Province of Bologna (31.12.2006 and 30.06.2007) 
 31.12 2006 30.06.2007 % variation 
In a state of 
unemployment 
41,761 43,277 +3.6 
of which Unemployed 30,331 31,694 +4.5 
Non-employed 11,430 11,583 +1.3 
Gender    
Male 16,817 17,468 +3.9 
Female 24,944 25,809 +3.5 
Age    
15-24 4,642 3,896 -16.1 
25-34 15,040 14,841 -1.3 
35-44 12,179 13,149 +8.0 
45-54 6,594 7,389 +12.1 
55-64 3,008 3,608 +19.9 
65 and over 298 394 +32.2 
Nationality    
Italian 32,446 33,306 +2.7 
Other 9,295 9,971 7.3 
Educational 
qualifications 
   
Not indicated 4,858 4,986 +2.6 
No qualifications 3,851 3,534 -8.2 
Primary or middle 
school 
14,363 15,094 +5.1 
Technical college 1,467 1,599 +9.0 
High School 10,889 11,368 +4.3 
3-yr. degree 473 518 +9.5 
University 
qualification 
5,860 6,178 +5.3 
Source: Province of Bologna, SILER, figures at the 30th June 2007 
 
The “negative” differential characteristics of those people registered with the Job Centres are 
obviously reflected on the results of the actions taken. Figures 4 shows the survival curve of job 
start-ups, calculated using the methods adopted by Cox and Oates (1984), separated into figures for 
those people starting jobs who are registered with the job Centres, and those starting jobs who have 
never been registered with any Job Centres (those who have started work having found jobs either 
through private employment agencies or through informal relational networks). 
It is clear that the likelihood of remaining in the “job starter” status is constantly lower among those 
registered with the Job Centres than it is among those in the other group
3
.  However, assessing 
causal links between the programmed intervention and observed employment outcomes is not easy, 
since it requires the effects of Job Centre actions to be disentangled from the effects of the structural 
characteristics of the unemployed which condition the likelihood of them finding a job. It is 
incorrect, nevertheless, to draw conclusions about the efficacy of the actions of the public 
employment services, since the above analysis may be substantially shaped by the compound effect 
of various factors. The structural characteristics of Job Centre users are such that it is more likely 
that they will find jobs expected to last for shorter periods of time. Thus in order to express an 
empirically well-founded judgement, account must be taken of the specific characteristics of those 
registered with the Job Centres. 
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 Only the survival curves for those starting temporary jobs have been calculated, as in the case of those starting 
permanent jobs, such curves are virtually imperceptible.  
Figure 4 -  Survival curves for those starting temporary jobs: registered Job Centre (CPI) 
users v those not registered with the Job Centres (2006) 
 
 
To this end, we may wish to employ a rather complex statistical approach known as the “causal 
inference” approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983 & 1984, Bondonio and Grenbaum, 2007). 
Unlike these works, that use the propensity score approach, we developed a new one (Camillo e 
Girotti, 2008, Camillo and D’Attoma, 2008), which is based on  a multidimensional approach in 
computing a local (for cluster of units) effect. It can be viewed as a two-stages’ procedure: 
1. we derive a factorial de-conditioned space using a specific eigenvalues and eigenvectors 
transformation of the original pre-handling variables; here we adopt a new approach to 
measuring selection bias and test balance by preserving the multivariate nature of data. The 
main idea lies in the use of a partial dependence analysis as a tool for investigating the 
dependence relationship between a set of observable covariates X and a handling indicator 
variable T, in order to obtain a measure of imbalance according to their dependence; 
2. we compute a continuous multidimensional space using an MCA (Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis) transformation, and we define clusters whereby using the tools in step 1, we can 
verify the balancing property for each sub-space (cluster) and then it is possible to realize 
the computation of the evaluation. 
The Camillo-D’Attoma method, grounded as it is in a non-theoretical, statistical approach (rather 
than in economic theory requiring a certain degree of subjectivity), uses patterns in the data to 
eliminate any variation associated with handling status, by creating a “de-conditioned” space in 
which it is possible to conduct an unbiased analysis. 
To put it briefly, homogeneous groups of workers who had started jobs in the period 2004-2006 
were built, according to a set of demographical and social characteristics present in the SILER 
database, using however a criterion that made it possible to remove any effects from group 
homogeneity that are simply associated with the fact of being registered with the Job Centre or 
otherwise. During the subsequent phase of the procedure, one may compare those workers 
registered at Job Centres, with those not registered, separately within each group, with reference to 
certain phenomena which may be considered of relevance to an analysis of the efficacy of the 
actions of Bologna Province’s Job Centres. Our chosen objective variable is the percentage of 
people hired on permanent employment contracts, as we consider this type of contract to be the one 
that in general is the best for the workers in question. 
The following variables were used to construct the groups: gender (2 options), age group (4 
options), civil status (8 options), area of birth (9 options), nationality (9 options), area of residence 
(9 options), area of home address (9 options) citizenship of the EU or otherwise (2 options). A total 
of 14 clusters were thus obtained, and their respective weights on the total population are given in 
Table 5 below.  
 
Table 5 -  Percentage weight of the clusters 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 below shows the expected and observed distributions of the percentage of those hired on 
permanent contracts among the 14 clusters defining a similar number of “common supports” on the 
basis of which “treated” and “non-treated” can be compared.  
Table 6 – Actual and expected distribution according to the non-existence of effects  
 
The average effect of being registered with the Job Centre is, on the whole, a negative one: the 
expected figure for hiring on permanent contracts is 20.59%, compared with the actual figure of 
8.29%. in other words, if   registration with the Job Centre had had no influence on the “permanent 
– temporary” dichotomy, we would have seen 20,59% of start-ups on permanent contracts, whereas 
the observed figure was much lower, at 8.29%. Of course, this is all in keeping with the 
abovementioned criteria concerning the causal inference approach, that is, the elimination of any 
influence exercised by pre-handling variables, and thus net of any effects associated not with 
handling, but with the (observed) characteristics of single individuals.  
Examining the result more closely, they can be divided into hiring (job start-up) clusters of a 
homogeneous nature in terms of the characteristics of those subjects included therein. The 
following clusters are those where “registration with the Job Centre” had a positive effect; 4, 5, 7 
and 13 (as shown in the table). In other words, the average effect is really the composition of partial 
effects, some of which are positive, which means that registration with the Job Centre may be 
beneficial, depending on the characteristics of the person in question. The meaning of this result 
could be connected to the varying ability of the diverse Job Centres to orientate job-seekers towards 
permanent jobs on the basis of the users’ various targets, and thus to achieve more effective action 
with regard to certain specific segments, where registration with the Job Centre leads to people 
being more easily hired on permanent contracts than average expectations would give us to believe. 
The clusters that were positively affected by the actions of the Job Centres are those with certain 
socio-demographic peculiarities compared with the average. For example, cluster 4 is mainly 
composed of women aged over 40 who live outside of the city of Bologna. It is interesting to see 
that the married or unmarried status of such subjects does not come into play here. Another 
positively affected cluster is cluster 7, composed mainly of women of child-bearing age, 25-31, 
most of whom were born and live in the provincial area outside of the city of Bologna, and who are 
likely to be “single”. Another interesting example would seem to be cluster 13, where the effect of 
Job Centre registration is slightly positive: this cluster is composed in the main of persons from 
North Africa, male and aged between 30 and 40. The other cluster which is positively affected by 
the Job Centre registration factor is cluster 5, and this is the most important of them all for the Job 
Centres, from the point of view of weight – 19.83% - among those registered with the Jobcentres 
(see Table 6). This cluster contains a high percentage of older working women, resident and living 
in Bologna but probably born in the South or North-East of Italy, and in any case married. 
Altogether, the aforesaid 4 clusters for which Job Centre registration has had a positive effect, 
account for a total of 32% of all hirings. 
It should be pointed out, however, that with reference exclusively to those registered with a Job 
Centre, the abovementioned four groups account for all of 49% of total hirings; thus we can 
conclude that among those who register with the public employment services, the work of these 
services proves to be effective in countering their unfavourable employability ratings. 
The results obtained show how the effects of Job Centre registration are not always of the same sign 
(positive or negative) or of the same intensity, and how this depends toa  large extent on the specific 
characteristics of the people in question. This could be due to a kind of “productive specialisation” 
that the Job Centres have acquired, over the course of time, when it comes to providing their 
intermediation services to job seekers and employers; and this specialisation may the reason why 
they perform better (in terms of the proportion of job seekers who find permanent jobs) when it 
comes to certain segments that are perhaps socially “weaker”, than in the case of other “stronger” 
segments, where the Job Centres seem to under-perform to a certain extent. 
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